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redaktionsbüro: Manuela Hötzl
Boris Buden:
- In the process of analysing a linguistic term your book also describes the mood in Europe at present. From your point of view, what questions does the language problem in Europe raise?
- The main question in my book is about the future of Europe. One of my theses is that there is no European language per se, and that none of the national European languages can take over this role. But how can a Europe, which wants to unify, communicate in future? What common language – which is necessary, if Europe wants to be truly democratic – should the European public speak? The language of Europe can only be understood as a kind of translation practice, a linguistic communication that takes place as a process of constant reciprocal translation. At present there is no real awareness of this challenge. But in the future neither intellectuals nor politicians will be able to avoid this problem.
- In the course of your search for the "true goal of translations" you also look for the "lost social emancipation". Could this be the "new ideological start of Europe" that Slavoj Žižek writes about on the flyleaf to your book?
- The main thesis of my book is that in our post-modern era all spheres of social life but above all the political one are translated into culture, or, if you prefer, into the language of culture. Today culture has become a kind of ultimate translation. We can no longer manage to escape the all-embracing notion of culture. This is the point where it must become clear that, unlike what some people believe, we cannot expect global emancipation through cultural translation alone. The "new beginning", which Žižek calls for, means nothing less than a re-politicisation of our historical experience and the economic sphere. The first step towards this new beginning is the recognition that there is also experience lying outside of the field of culture and that this experience can only be made as a result of practical change. Previously this change was called revolution, but today we have to reinvent it.
- Do you believe that a Europe which wishes to define itself through a common cultural identity is on the wrong track?
- Of course Europe is on the wrong track if it believes that cultural development alone can decide its destiny. This belief is even very dangerous, as it makes us blind to political contradictions and the new, as yet unknown, antagonisms that the project of European unification will inevitably bring with it. My book is directed precisely against this political blindness. Or, to put it more precisely, against the naïve belief in a new cultural identity, an identity that is supposed to develop outside of the old concept of the European nations' fundamental identities, as a kind of "cultural hybridism". This is supposed to spare us giving an answer to the equally decisive question about Europe's future, i.e. whether Europe should develop into a kind of federal nation state. Sooner or later the sovereignty of the existing nation states will have to be abolished, or, contrariwise, Europe must try out a completely different form of democracy.

- What form of democracy might that be?
- It could be something that refers back to the tradition of the European revolutions or, to be more precise, to the experiences of the revolutionary soviet republics.
- But surely the German soviet republics quickly collapsed due to constant internal disagreement?
- I myself don't feel so badly in this kind of perennial dispute – out of which my book too developed. But, to put joking aside: what we are talking about here is a different experience of democracy, an alternative concept of democracy. Just as my own cultural identity, if I have one, no longer fits into the conceptual framework of a national culture. But precisely this can no longer be translated into the political realm and there is, as yet, no democracy outside of the nation state. In this area I am both politically and culturally a nobody, a wage-earner, whose rights are far fewer than those of the working classes a hundred years ago, I am, as a Croatian nationalist once said about a nation without a state, "like a piece of shit in the rain".
- One chapter of your book is entitled "The Society that Confuses Politics with Culture". Is this a criticism of the thesis of the 'Civil Society' as a supporter of culture?
- As we know the civil society, the subject of an epochal renewal of democracy, is an Eastern European invention or, to put it more accurately, an invention of the masses and the dissidents that fought against communist totalitarianism and brought about the collapse of so-called real socialism. But a great deal has changed in the meantime and many of the hopes of the democratic revolutions of 1989 have turned out to be illusory. Instead of democratic renewal global capitalism came along, bringing with it unemployment and criminal privatisations. This development was also accompanied by ghosts from the past (long declared exorcised), above all the spectre of nationalism.
- How does this new nationalism manifest itself?
- The civil societies of Eastern and South-eastern Europe have almost completely lost the normative value they had before 1989. Veterans of the fascist movements from the time of the Second World War, or former Nazi collaborators, anti-Semites and chauvinists of every kind, clerical conservatives, pro-life fanatics, skinheads, cultural racists, nationalists etc. are in many places the most active elements in the respective civil society. A number of people such as myself have attempted to escape from this kind of civil society by emigrating. This historic experience is awaiting translation into the political realm. In as far as culture and art are aware of this task, they can also positively influence present-day civil societies in Eastern and South-eastern Europe.
- How did you personally experience the changes in Croatia?
- Croatia is today still dreaming of its area of cultural sovereignty and is consequently working towards the self-isolation of its culture. Although the Croatians have essentially the same language as the Serbs and the Bosnians they are attempting to radically distinguish their version from the other two. This means that they are doing their own language untold damage. The consequence of this linguistic autism is a situation reminiscent of the position in the 19th century, when Croatia was still part of the Habsburg monarchy. At that time most of the elite studied in Vienna and spoke German, the language of knowledge, intellectual communication and sophisticated culture. The mass of the people had to make do with their completely autistic native tongue, Croatian, which was incapable of serious cultural and intellectual production.
- Has German been replaced by a new "language of the elite"?
- The language of the elite nowadays is English. This elite studies abroad, mostly at American or British university faculties, where intellectual communication takes place primarily in English.
- Could English not take over the role of a common European language?
- The French philosopher Etienne Balibar has pointed out that English is "more or less" the European language. But English is also the language of global communication and exists in many different forms. On the other hand English is the language of only two of the European nations. Why should this language in particular take on the role of the language of Europe?
- What importance does Russian have for Eastern and South-eastern European countries? Was it not for a long time a common (albeit compulsory) language?
- Russian was never really a “lingua franca“ in the eastern areas of Europe. Although for ideological reasons and due to political pressure people in the former Soviet block did learn Russian, in cultural terms the Soviet Union never succeeded in establishing hegemony in the former East Block. Of course this doesn't apply to those countries that were formerly part of the USSR, where today Russian is still understood and spoken everywhere.
- You take as your starting point Wilhelm von Humboldt's understanding of language, which ultimately defines a nation exclusively in terms of language. Have the Eastern and South-eastern European countries perhaps too readily adopted this concept?
- The idea of a homology between language and culture, which ultimately implies that there can be no European culture per se, or that European culture is only a kind of summation of European national cultures, is based on Humboldt's understanding of language as a self-contained totality and the expression of a self-contained community.
The nations of Eastern and South-eastern Europe also experienced the romantic phase of nation building, mostly in the 19th century. This happened although most of them did not immediately succeed in crowning this cultural "revival" with the founding of their own nation state. If their aim today is to bring this process to its final conclusion by political means, then this seems a kind of anachronism
- Does the same kind of thing happen in the West?
- Here one has only to think of all the institutions of so-called national culture that still continue to enjoy official support, both in Eastern and Western Europe, and which dominate cultural life in the whole of Europe. Therefore institutionally European culture and the educational systems of the European peoples (that are based on national languages) still remain at the same stage of development as in the 19th century.
- More and more countries, including Austria, are compelling foreigners to learn the language of the country they live in. Do you think this is right?
- This kind of compulsion is contra-productive. And furthermore it is motivated by the same conservative historical perspective, i.e. the conviction that national culture forms the ultimate horizon of modern culture and whoever doesn't possess it is without culture or primitive. Etienne Balibar, whom I referred to earlier, believed that the future of European culture lies with those people who have gone beyond the horizon of national culture.
- Mixed-languages are developing and are particularly characteristic of second and third generation non-nationals. What influence do these languages have?
- I would not call them mixed languages; in fact they are a kind of hybridisation. This is not just a mixture of different languages but can also be understood as a continuous, reciprocal translation of the respective languages. The most important thing here is that the confrontation with the notion of foreign, involved in translation, does not contaminate a language
but enriches it.
- What translation methods do you think should be used in the EU?
- I can't answer this question. But one thing should be emphasised: translation is increasingly more than a merely linguistic process. It is always also a cultural, political and social examination of what is foreign. As I see it the so-called linguistic or literary translation is only a part of "translation practice".
- In the future ought all of us speak more languages?
- Yes, even if we don’t talk and understand them perfectly, we should use them and savour the taste of them in our mouths.
Boris Buden, who was born in Croatia in 1958, studied classic and modern philosophy in Klagenfurt, Zagreb and Ljubljana. Since 1984 he has worked as a free-lance journalist and writer. Buden regularly publishes philosophical and political essays as well as cultural criticism in German, English and French.

While an activist in the Croatian peace movement he founded the journal "arkzin" in 1993. Slavoj Žižek has written about Buden's most recent book, „Der Schacht von Babel – Ist Kultur übersetzbar?“ (The Pit of Babel – is Culture Translatable?) that it "hits the very core of the ideological confusion" and performs that "cutting of the Gordian knot" essential for a new beginning.

Buden, Boris, Der Schacht von Babel – Ist Kultur übersetzbar?, Kulturverlag Kadmos, Berlin 2004, 224 pages, paperback, EUR 19.90


Text published in: REPORT.Magazine for Arts and Civil Society in Eastern- and Central Europe,February 2005