News *East About us Archive Imprint Deutsch




redaktionsbüro: Bert Rebhandl
Hartmut Kälble:
- Professor Kälble, you have researched concepts of European identity in the 19th and 20th centuries. Today the EU extends far into Eastern Europe, and Ukraine and Turkey would like to become members. What kind of concepts could this large Europe call upon?
- I think that there are not necessarily political programmes or formulated concepts; but what makes Europe attractive, not only for Eastern Europe, is that, thanks to integration, it has proved possible to ensure peace within Europe. This was, especially after the Cold War, an important experience. Secondly, it was possible to stabilise democracy. Think for instance about the Iberian peninsula, the EU has done quite a bit in this respect. Thirdly, Europe is a prosperous region and other countries wish to achieve prosperity through membership. And in Eastern and Southeastern Europe there is a fourth goal that the EU can achieve, namely security, above all as regards Russia because the experience of the Soviet Union still lurks there in the background. In this respect it is in many cases the USA that people look to, as the EU has less military potential, and this is always a source of tension.
- The nation state was “invented” in Europe. Now the development is in the direction of a league of states or a federal state – will this not inevitably lead to new tensions?
- Tensions in the EU do not really develop between Europe and the nations. The main reason for such tensions lies elsewhere. The Commission represents a certain direction, it is economically liberal to neo-liberal, whereas many Europeans value social security extremely highly. Generally speaking the EU has stabilised and economically strengthened the nation state. It represents more an alliance to rescue the nation state rather than an organisation to replace the nation state. In certain countries such as Great Britain or Poland there is, nevertheless, a particularly tense relationship to supra-national institutions.
- In Poland, in particular, typically populistic strategies are evident. The country profits from membership but the government keeps its distance, and at times uses strong words.
- I don’t know Poland well but I teach regularly at the European College in Warsaw. Much of the severity and uncompromising approach that the Polish goverment shows in its dealings with Europe has to do with internal affairs. After 1989 the country did not succeed in building up an efficient goverment that would be impervious to corruption, therefore the current government is attempting to remedy this and thus feels obliged to present itself on all fronts as a tough country – this is a plausible explanation. But besides rhetorics what ultimately counts is how willing Poland is to compromise in practical matters. From this government there were also proposals like the one for a European army (there again the concern for security is in the background), this is an extremely European idea and goes further than many British proposals. As regards Europe the current government does not necessarily represent the views of the majority of the population.
- The historian and political scientist Jacques Rupnik has written with regard to Poland that the mixture of nationalism and Catholicism that formed an important part of the resistance to Communism does not greatly contribute to the development of democratic traditions. Generally, he writes, that a return to pre-communist traditions is difficult as the democratic basis is lacking
- If one looks at the interwar period, few European countries had solid democratic traditions. In Germany the attempt was short-lived, in Austria it lasted perhaps half-a-year longer, in Italy fascism came earlier. Czechoslovakia was the only eastern central European country in which democracy was not toppled internally but by the National Socialists, and in some Baltic countries it survived longer than in Germany. In this respect in large areas of Europe that today enjoy a stable democracy, including Austria, the interwar period is not a model. Conversely, the experience of the non-democratic Soviet Union has sharpened the view of the former “satellite states”. The image of democracy has also changed. Back then it was regarded as a form of government not capable of achieving much. Over the last 40 years in Western Europe it has shown that it is most definitely capable of creating prosperity, in contrast to the situation after the First World War. And as far as the social state is concerned, which after the Second World War formed a central element in the stabilisation of democracy, it has been the subject of massive criticism for 30 years. But when one looks at the budgets the expenditure on the social state is being massively increased. In Eastern Central Europe this orientation towards social security is so great that in relation to the gross national product these countries spend roughly as much as the Western countries. The neo-liberal proposals of the early 1990s have not been implemented, there is a European path based on social security, but due the respective economic situation the individual countries are not always in a position to protect it.
- In many European countries, independent of the level of prosperity, there exists a populist potential of around 20 per cent of the electorate. What is the reason for this ?
- A difficult problem. In Germany at the moment right-wing populism is not at the same level, this has to do with the past for which Germany has had to pay a high price. Decisive for me is the fact that all European countries, truly all of them, are immigration countries because the economy needs these immigrants. The populist right-wing parties have succeeded in making an argument out of this. Secondly in many countries such as Italy or France there exists a considerable number of voters who were previously associated with the communists. Through the complete loss of political trust in the Communist Party there has been a drift to the right. Thirdly, poverty is growing and these social reasons also play a role, although many right-wing radicals have good jobs.
- Jacques Rupnik sees the ability to integrate radical tendencies as one of Europe’s essential characteristics.
- We must take the danger of populism seriously. What is needed is a local civil society that must react to this problem. Currently, I don’t see any danger that these groupings will achieve power at national level. I also think, however, that the EU doesn’t possess an instrument to deal adequately with this problem.
- The EU is currently negotiating with Turkey about possible entry, albeit not in the near future. How do you see the perspectives?
- There are many reasons in favour: Turkey forms a part of the western security system, in addition there should be somewhere a Muslim country with a functioning democracy, this project would be supported by membership. Turkey is also strongly linked with Europe, there is much that moves back and forth between Turkey and Europe, ideas, … Personally I am sceptical, above all because of the practical difficulties involved – it would stretch the capacity of EU institutions to the limit.
- People speak nowadays of a multi-polar world – what role can Europe aspire to and play in such a world?
- Europe certainly cannot aim to become an empire – say like the USA, perhaps China also, and, some time or other, India. The military might and also the will to achieve this is lacking. What Europe can do is to present certain models to the world – social security, relatively little military intervention, sustainability and environmental conservation, a reduced amount of state violence internally (no death penalty, no possession of weapons).Europe is the most important trader on the world market, on the world education market it is only just behind the USA. To put it concisely, it does not present a weak figure that says something and then is not heeded.

The interview was carried out by Bert Rebhandl, who lives in Berlin as a freelance journalist and author.


Text published in: REPORT.Magazine for Arts and Civil Society in Eastern- and Central Europe,March 2007